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NO. 28 JUNE 2019 Introduction 
A Redefinition of “Spitzenkandidaten” 
The Next EU Commission Needs a Common Political Mandate 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
The European Union’s (EU) citizens have voted, and now the EU institutions are due 
to be reorganised for the next political cycle. Most attention is focussed on personnel 
issues, but the reorganisation of policy priorities and the structure of the EU Commis-
sion are equally important. At the end of Jean-Claude Juncker’s term as President of 
the European Commission, the results are mixed: The Commission has become more 
focussed and internally coherent, but even at the end of the legislative period, many 
of its legislative proposals were not able to obtain a majority in the European Par-
liament and/or the Council of the EU. The mission statement of the political Commis-
sion has increasingly proven to be incompatible with the control tasks of the EU’s 
highest executive body. The new Commission will operate in an even more difficult 
political environment and will itself become more party-politically heterogeneous. Its 
realignment should therefore also be used as an opportunity to interpret the “Spitzen-
kandidaten” principle differently and negotiate a joint political programme for the 
EU between the Parliament, the Council, and the new Commission. 
 
At the beginning of each legislative period 
of the European Parliament (EP), the EU 
institutions are reorganised for the new 
institutional cycle. The election of the Presi-
dent of the European Commission is closely 
linked to the nomination of the High Rep-
resentative, the President of the European 
Council, the President of the European Par-
liament, and the other members of the Com-
mission. In 2019, the succession of the Presi-
dent of the European Central Bank, Mario 
Draghi, will also be decided upon. Although 
originally intended to be separated from 
the party-political negotiations, this nomi-
nation will inevitably be included in the 
power poker between the member states. 
This complex process is accompanied by 
rivalries at three levels: between the parties 
in the EP, which are competing to organise 
a majority after the elections; between the 
EP and the national governments in the 
European Council on the question of who 
selects the President of the Commission; 
and lastly between the member states, 
which are interested in using their influ-
ence to the fullest possible extent. 
The Presidency of the European Commis-
sion still holds the key position in this insti-
tutional – and programmatic – reposi-
tioning, although the Commission has lost 
importance in the EU’s political system over 
the last decade. Indeed, the European Coun-
SWP Comment 28 
June 2019 
2 
cil is the forum in which the major com-
promises between the member states are 
negotiated, and the Parliament has gained 
more influence in shaping EU legislation. 
Yet, the sole legislative right of initiative 
remains with the EU Commission, which 
represents the EU in important negotiations 
(such as in regards to Brexit with the United 
Kingdom), and it acts as “guardian of the 
treaties” in the implementation of EU legis-
lation and the protection of the rule of law. 
Mixed Assessment of the 
“Last Chance Commission” 
The realignment of the European Com-
mission is therefore an important building 
block for the political orientation of the 
EU. Therefore, it is worth reviewing the last 
Commission. When the Juncker Commis-
sion was elected in 2014, the EU – and 
especially the eurozone – was in the midst 
of the most severe financial and economic 
crisis of the post-war period. Juncker started 
out with the claim that the team he led had 
to regain the trust of the citizens and called 
it the “Last Chance Commission”. But the 
Juncker Commission’s term in office was 
marked by further crises – the Grexit 
debate, the refugee crisis, the Brexit vote, 
and the trade conflict with the United 
States are only the most visible landmarks 
of a persistently challenging era. 
At least the economic situation in the 
Union has stabilised during the Juncker 
Commission’s term of office. Confidence in 
the EU has also grown again, notably after 
the Brexit vote. In March 2019, 62 per cent 
of respondents gave a positive assessment 
of the EU, compared with 50 per cent in 
2014. The same applies to the EU Commis-
sion as an institution. In 2018, more people 
in the EU (46 per cent) trusted the Commis-
sion than in 2014 (32 per cent). 
Simultaneously, however, the crisis in 
the European Union has developed from 
being primarily an economic one to a politi-
cal one. EU-sceptical parties have gained 
support in almost all national elections in 
EU member states between 2014 and 2019. 
In several states, they have also succeeded 
in assuming government responsibility, for 
example in Italy and (temporarily) Austria. 
A major breakthrough did not materialise 
in the 2019 European elections, but in four 
of the six largest EU states (France, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, Poland), EU-sceptical 
parties became the strongest force. In the 
EP they are divided (so far) into three fac-
tions and far from forming their own major-
ity, at least for the time being. But together 
they now make up more than 20 per cent 
of the Members of European Parliament 
(MEPs). In contrast, the informal grand coa-
lition of the European People’s Party (EPP) 
and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) has 
lost its majority. 
The Limits of the 
Political Commission 
The next Commission must now seek a 
new political foundation in the EP. Under 
Juncker’s leadership, it had seen itself as a 
“highly political” Commission that would 
not only administer EU policy, but also 
shape it actively along clear – and even 
controversial – political lines. Juncker 
wanted to set himself apart from his pre-
decessor, José Manuel Barroso, whose Com-
mission leadership was regarded as tech-
nocratic and subordinate to the member 
states in the European Council. 
In practice, the claim of a political Com-
mission was based on two pillars: The first 
was the political legitimacy of Commission 
President Juncker himself. In 2014, the 
holder of this office was elected for the first 
time by the European Parliament, following 
the proposal of the heads of state and gov-
ernment in the European Council. In accord-
ance with the “Spitzenkandidaten” princi-
ple (top/lead candidates principle), Juncker 
was able to assert himself as an official can-
didate for the EPP. From then on, the Presi-
dent of the Commission referred to the dual 
legitimacy of the national governments and 
the EP. In practice, however, the authority 
that could have been derived from this 
legitimacy was limited. In the European 
Council, the governments of the large mem-
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ber states continue to set the tone. The 
President of the Commission has only 
limited influence on its seminal decisions. 
In the EP, although there was a very close 
exchange between the leadership of the two 
major parties and the Commission at the 
beginning of the parliamentary term, a co-
operation comparable to one between a 
national government and its parliamentary 
base with a coordinated programme did 
not emerge. 
The second pillar that the “political” 
Commission was based on was the claim to 
set its own priorities and to take decisions 
according to political – not purely tech-
nocratic – criteria. It is in this area that the 
contradictions of the European Commission 
have become most apparent. The self-image 
of acting as a political body is difficult to 
reconcile with the provisions of the EU 
Treaty, according to which the Commission 
is to act not only as the engine of integra-
tion, but also as the guardian of the trea-
ties. In some policy areas – such as com-
petition policy, the protection of the rule of 
law, budgetary control in the euro area, and 
infringement proceedings – it should act 
as a neutral arbitrator and decide on the 
basis of technocratic rather than political 
criteria. Even if the relevant departments 
of the Commission are internally protected 
from political influence, its credibility as a 
neutral body is diminished if the Commis-
sion’s leadership sees itself as a political 
actor. 
Two examples from the previous legis-
lative period make this contradiction par-
ticularly clear. Over the past five years, the 
protection of the rule of law within the 
Union has become one of the Commission’s 
most important and controversial tasks. 
Whereas the EPP-led Commission relatively 
quickly instituted rule of law proceedings 
against Poland, it was much more hesitant 
towards Hungary – whose governing party, 
Fidesz, (still) belongs to the EPP. Both the 
Polish and Hungarian governments have ac-
cused the responsible EU Commissioner – 
Frans Timmermans, a leading head of the 
Party of European Socialists (PES) – of 
being politically motivated. Irrespective 
of how individual rule of law procedures 
are assessed, the modalities that accom-
panied them have shown that the Com-
mission cannot credibly act as a neutral 
authority here. 
A similar problem can be seen in the 
control of national economic and budge-
tary policies, in particular those of the euro 
states. In the wake of the European debt 
crisis, the competences of the European 
Commission in monitoring the budgets of 
the member states have been extended even 
further. Here, too, the EU Commission 
should decide on the basis of technical cri-
teria. The different ways of dealing with 
the respective budget deficits of France (led 
by President Emmanuel Macron) and Italy 
(governed by a coalition of the EU-sceptical 
Five Star Movement and Lega) have made 
it clear that political considerations also 
flow into the assessment of member states’ 
budgets. 
More Cohesion, Clearer Priorities 
The Juncker Commission was more success-
ful in rationalising European legislation. 
Juncker wanted to significantly reduce the 
number of new legislative initiatives with 
the aim of leading an EU that concentrates 
on the essentials and sets clear priorities, 
adopting the unofficial motto of being 
“big on big things, small on small things”. 
To this end, Juncker has fundamentally 
transformed the way the Commission 
works. The President is free to determine 
the internal organisation and composition 
of the Commission. At the beginning of 
the parliamentary term, Juncker introduced 
a hierarchy within the Commission and 
formed clusters. With 28 commissioners, 
the College of the EU Commission is larger 
than most national governments’ cabinets. 
However, a reduction in the size of the 
Commission has so far repeatedly been 
blocked, especially by the smaller EU states; 
it would be legally possible without a treaty 
amendment, but it would require the ap-
proval of all member states. Instead, to 
improve the functioning of the Commis-
sion, Juncker has equipped the Vice-Presi-
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dents with their own leadership competen-
cies within the Commission and arranged 
them into seven clusters. For example, the 
High Representative and Vice-President of 
the Commission, Federica Mogherini, co-
ordinates the foreign- and security policy–
related work of the Commission members 
responsible for the European Neighbour-
hood Policy and Enlargement, Trade Policy, 
Development Policy, and Humanitarian 
Aid. As a result, the coherence of the EU’s 
foreign policy between the Common For-
eign and Security Policy and the areas 
managed by the Commission has increased 
significantly. 
Secondly, the Commission has identified 
10 political priorities for its activities under 
Juncker. Only those initiatives were put on 
the Commission’s agenda that fell within 
one of the 10 priorities and were previously 
recommended by the responsible Vice-Presi-
dent, turning them into gatekeepers on the 
Commission’s blossoming legislative pro-
posals. 
In practice, the Juncker Commission has 
largely achieved its objective of economis-
ing and prioritising the Commission’s activ-
ities. First of all, it has significantly reduced 
the number of legislative proposals. Where-
as the EU adopted, according to EUR-Lex, 
well over 250 legislative acts (directives 
and regulations) per year on average before 
2009, the average number during the 
Juncker Commission’s term of office was 
130 per year. The reduction was so drastic 
that, at the beginning of the legislative 
period, some MEPs complained about a lack 
of legislative initiatives on the part of the 
EU Commission. As of June 2019, a total 
of 517 EU directives and regulations were 
adopted by the Council and the EP during 
the five years of the Juncker Commission. 
In comparison, during the second term of 
Juncker’s predecessor, Barroso (2010–
2014), the figure was 716, almost 40 per 
cent higher. 
Although the announced reduction in 
legislative output has certainly taken place, 
the balance is more mixed with regard to its 
policy aims achieved. The adoption of Euro-
pean directives and regulations is the sole 
responsibility of the Parliament and the 
Council. It is true that the Commission, 
according to its own figures, has actually 
presented 94 per cent of the initiatives that 
it has envisaged within its 10 priorities. 
However, only two-thirds of the dossiers 
were approved by EU legislators. 
No Strong Agenda-setter 
The discrepancy is particularly marked in 
the legislative projects to which the Com-
mission has assigned a high political 
priority. Traditionally, the Commission’s 
monopoly of initiative is also intended to 
act as a “engine of integration” and to 
advance the Union on fundamental issues 
such as the development of the internal 
market and the introduction of the euro. In 
the complex institutional structure of the 
Union, the Commission can – and could – 
never dictate EU policy alone, but is de-
pendent on winning the support of the 
majority of the EP and, above all, of the 
member states in the Council for its 
political projects by proposing clever and 
workable compromises. 
A successful example of this is the han-
dling of the Brexit process by the Juncker 
Commission. With the early nomination of 
Michel Barnier as negotiator in the Article 
50 process, the EU Commission has not 
only taken over the direct talks with the 
United Kingdom. Above all, Barnier and his 
working group have recorded and processed 
the political interests of the member states 
with regard to Brexit through numerous vis-
its to all 27 capitals and regular exchanges 
in the EU bodies, thus making a decisive 
contribution towards the EU-27 adopting a 
uniform position in this process. Although 
the negotiating mandate has been set by 
the heads of state and government in the 
European Council, the Commission has 
provided substantial input and conducted 
the negotiations. This political leadership 
has also given the EU Commission the full 
confidence of the national governments 
in the Brexit negotiations. 
The situation is different with the EU 
Commission’s major political initiatives. In 
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his annual “State of the Union” speeches to 
the European Parliament, Juncker focussed 
mostly on three of his ten priorities: Point 
one was “jobs, growth and investment”. 
Juncker was able to win the support of the 
Parliament and the Council for the Euro-
pean Fund for Strategic Investments early 
on, which to date has mobilised 73 billion 
euros in funding for investments, with a 
volume of almost 400 billion euros in the 
EU. In the field of trade policy, the Juncker 
Commission has also negotiated extensive 
new free trade agreements for the EU, inter 
alia with Canada and Japan. 
However, in the second project – the 
further development of the euro area – the 
Commission has widely missed its targets. 
At the end of 2017, the Commission pre-
sented its “Roadmap for the deepening of 
Europe’s economic and monetary union”. 
Key proposals included the establishment 
of a European Monetary Fund; the transfer 
of the Fiscal Compact into EU law, which, 
under international law, is not part of the 
EU Treaty; a special budget for the euro 
area within the EU budget; and the appoint-
ment of a European Minister for Economic 
Affairs and Finance. These proposals have 
been met with direct, massive rejection in 
several eurozone states. At the end of its 
term of office, the Juncker Commission has 
not yet achieved any of these goals. Nego-
tiations on a – much more limited – 
“Budgetary Instrument for Convergence 
and Competitiveness” in the eurozone have 
progressed the furthest. This, however, is 
mainly due to the impetus given by Ger-
many and France in this matter. 
The third area to which Juncker gave 
priority was the asylum and migration 
policy. In the course of the last legislative 
period, this issue was elevated to the Com-
mission’s most important issue. As early as 
2016, the Commission presented two major 
legislative packages to reform the Common 
European Asylum System. Despite intensive 
negotiations, however, it has not succeeded 
in obtaining the approval of the Council, 
in particular for its flagship projects in this 
policy area, such as the reform of the 
Dublin regime. 
The lack of progress in all of these highly 
political areas can, of course, be attributed 
only partly to the Commission. In its “Stra-
tegic Agenda” for 2014 to 2019, the Euro-
pean Council has also declared as priorities 
the issues of competitiveness and reform of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
as well as EU asylum and migration policy. 
The reasons for the lack of agreement are 
to a large extent beyond the control of the 
Commission and found in the increasing 
tensions between the member states. Even 
in a series of summit meetings, the heads 
of state and government were only able 
to make modest progress on asylum and 
migration policy and eurozone reform. 
Nevertheless, the shortcomings of the 
Commission have become apparent in these 
highly political issues. Firstly, it lacks its 
own political power base. In parliamentary 
systems, national governments can rely on 
their government factions or coalitions as a 
foundation for power. Despite the “Spitzen-
kandidaten” principle, however, the Juncker 
Commission could not rely on continual sup-
port from the European Parliament. There 
was no coalition agreement with thematic 
objectives. At the same time, however, the 
Commission’s rapprochement with the EP 
has fuelled the member states’ concerns 
that they might lose control of this impor-
tant EU institution – a development that 
has also damaged the confidence of national 
governments in the Commission. 
Moreover, the Commission has been un-
able to become an honest broker between 
the member states in the Council and be-
tween the Council and the Parliament in 
highly controversial areas. The right of ini-
tiative gives the Commission the opportu-
nity to predetermine the debate at an early 
stage in the EU’s legislative processes. Ideally, 
this right could be used to shape EU inte-
gration through the careful exploration of 
preferences and subsequently tailored com-
promise proposals. The Commission has 
succeeded in this with the Brexit process. 
On migration policy and EMU reform, on 
the other hand, it first raised high expecta-
tions and then put forward ideas that were 
far from capable of generating a consensus. 
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The Difficult Political Environ-
ment of the Next Commission 
For the next EU Commission, the political 
environment will not become simpler. 
Firstly, there is the election of the President 
of the Commission. According to the EU 
Treaty, it is the European Parliament that 
elects a person for this office, but at the 
proposal of the heads of state and govern-
ment in the European Council. In 2014, 
the EP prevailed with its view that the Euro-
pean Council should only nominate the 
top candidate whose party won the Euro-
pean elections – after which Jean-Claude 
Juncker was elected President of the Com-
mission. This procedure gave him additional 
democratic legitimacy. On the part of the 
national governments, however, it also cost 
him confidence. In the run-up to the 2019 
European elections, the heads of state and 
government therefore stressed that there 
was “no automatism” and that they would 
not necessarily propose the lead candidate 
of the largest group after the elections. 
Shortly after the elections, the majority – 
but not all – of the political groups in the 
EP confirmed that they would only accept a 
top candidate as a nomination. At the same 
time, the three main political groups – the 
EPP, the S&D, and the newly formed Renew 
Europe (previous ALDE) – have so far not 
agreed on a common candidate. The heads 
of state and government in the European 
Council, on the other hand, have instructed 
Council President Donald Tusk to explore 
which personality could achieve a majority 
in both institutions: the European Council 
and the EP. While negotiations are going 
on, some national leaders, such as French 
President Macron, have already declared all 
three major “Spitzenkandidaten” as being 
out of the running. Thus, right at the begin-
ning of the new Commission’s term of off-
ice, there is the threat of both institutional 
and party political power struggles, which 
could damage the authority of the new 
Commission even before it has been elected. 
Secondly, the political composition of 
the College of Commissioners itself will be 
more heterogeneous. The principle remains 
that each EU country may nominate one 
Commissioner. Consequently, the party-
political composition of the Commission 
will not reflect that of the European Parlia-
ment, but that of the parliamentary major-
ities on which the national governments 
in the EU rely at the time the Commission 
is appointed. This tableau is much more 
heterogeneous in 2019 than it was in 2014: 
In the Juncker Commission, 27 out of 28 
members came from the three large party 
families – the EPP (Commission President, 
13 other Commissioners), the European 
Social Democrats (8 Commissioners), and 
ALDE (5 Commissioners). Meanwhile, the 
EPP and the PES have lost influence, while 
parties outside the European mainstream 
have come into government responsibility. 
If all national governments follow the logic 
of nominating a candidate for the Commis-
sion from the leading governing party, the 
composition will change as follows: The 
EPP – depending on the classification of 
Fidesz – would fall back to 6 or 7 mem-
bers, the PES would remain at 8, and the 
Liberals would catch up with 7. In addition, 
Commissioners from the European Left (1), 
hitherto independent parties (Lithuania, 
Austria), but also three from the EU-scep-
tical governments of Italy, Poland, and 
Hungary, plus – depending on the course 
of the Brexit process – a representative of 
the United Kingdom. The decisions of the 
College of Commissioners are taken using a 
simple majority so that individual Commis-
sion members can be overruled. Neverthe-
less, the integration of the Commissioners, 
especially from the last group, will be one 
of the main challenges for the next Com-
mission President. 
Thirdly, this fragmentation within the 
Commission only reflects the increasing 
fragmentation of the political institutions of 
the EU itself. This fragmentation will make 
it more difficult for the Commission – but 
above all for the EU as a whole – to take 
and enforce policy decisions. The Commis-
sion can only propose EU legislation; it 
must be adopted by the Council and/or the 
Parliament. Since tensions between national 
governments in the EU Council have al-
 SWP Comment 28 
 June 2019 
 7 
ready increased in recent years, majority 
voting in the European Parliament will 
become more complex after the May 2019 
elections. The previously dominant par-
ties – the EPP and the S&D – have lost 
their common absolute majority. Stable 
majorities now require the cooperation of 
at least three parliamentary groups. For 
the election of the President of the Com-
mission, talks on policy and personnel deci-
sions between the EPP, the S&D, Renew 
Europe, and the European Greens are prov-
ing difficult. However, changing majorities 
are possible for decisions on substantive 
issues, which the EP can also take with a 
relative majority. For example, on questions 
of consumer protection, a majority to the 
left of the centre with cooperation between 
the RE, the S&D, the Greens, and the Euro-
pean Left (GUE/NGL) is conceivable; on 
migration issues, cooperation between the 
parties to the right of the centre is conceiv-
able. In view of the growth for EU-sceptical 
parties, which together now hold 186 seats, 
EP votes will become more controversial – 
and thus more unpredictable for the Com-
mission and the Council. 
Redefine “Spitzenkandidaten”, 
Obtain a Political Mandate 
The start of the European legislative period 
is an opportunity to reorganise the EU Com-
mission in terms of personnel, politics, and 
institutions. There are four recommenda-
tions for the institutional development of 
the Commission following the experience 
of the Juncker era as well as the analysis of 
the new political situation after the Euro-
pean elections. 
Firstly, the Commission’s stronger insti-
tutional focus with its cluster structure has 
proved its worth. In the long term, the EU 
states should make use of the possibilities 
offered by the EU Treaty and abandon the 
principle of “one commissioner per mem-
ber state”. Until this has been achieved, 
however, the next Commission should also 
have a clear hierarchy and be divided into 
programmatic clusters. This organisational 
solution would also increase the coherence 
of the EU as a whole and make the Union’s 
legislation more stringent and targeted. 
The greater challenge for the Commis-
sion will, secondly, be to reconcile its am-
bition to act as a political institution with 
its assigned role as a neutral arbitrator. 
This contradiction will not be completely 
resolved without a Treaty amendment. 
A Commission whose President is elected 
by the European Parliament and which 
depends on a parliamentary majority, has 
a monopoly of initiative, and negotiates 
internationally on behalf of the EU is in-
evitably a political body that needs a strong 
political mandate. A return to an authority 
that takes its decisions solely on the basis 
of technical criteria is therefore neither 
desirable nor feasible for the EU. Instead, 
the next Commission should internally 
clearly separate those tasks for which it has 
to act neutrally from the political level or 
– as far as primary law allows – outsource 
them to independent bodies. For example, 
it could delegate more of its powers in 
supervising the eurozone states to the in-
dependent European Stability Mechanism 
and delegate its powers in controlling the 
rule of law to an independent EU agency. 
These bodies could fulfil control obligations 
more credibly while the Commission fo-
cusses on its policy tasks. 
Thirdly, for its political role, the Com-
mission needs a stronger mandate and a 
more stable anchoring in the Council and 
the Parliament. To this end, the EU should 
reinterpret the “Spitzenkandidaten” prin-
ciple. In 2014, the EP prevailed with the 
view that the candidate of the largest group 
should become Commission President. 
However, in the new Parliament – in 
which the cooperation of at least three 
groups is required for a majority – no 
group can claim to have won the European 
elections on its own. But instead of return-
ing to the old days of backdoor politics, it 
is necessary and sensible to return to the 
actual legal core of the principle: for the 
citizens of the EU to co-determine the Presi-
dent of the Commission with their election 
decisions, as is customary in a parliamen-
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tary democracy. This means that only a can-
didate who also took part in the election 
campaign should be elected to head the 
Commission. It is now up to the President 
of the European Council to explore with the 
parties which of them can organise a major-
ity in the EP. With such a procedure, the EU 
would take a real step towards parliamen-
tary democracy. 
Fourthly, the fragmentation in the EP 
and the blockade on central substantive 
issues mean that the EU needs to set cross-
institutional priorities. When Juncker was 
elected President of the Commission, the 
parties in the EP missed the opportunity to 
agree on substantive policy priorities. An 
EU capable of action, however, requires 
agreement on a programmatic agenda 
linked to the personnel package. On the 
one hand, this applies to the EP itself, in 
which the parties involved in the “coalition 
talks” could put together a package of ac-
companying political and substantive nego-
tiations. But it also applies to the relation-
ship between the institutions. The heads of 
state and government began negotiations 
on their “Strategic Agenda” for 2019 to 
2024 at their informal meeting in Sibiu two 
weeks before the elections, as though the 
European elections were irrelevant to the 
EU’s priorities. They adopted them in June 
before the decision on the EU Commission 
President was taken. This strategic debate 
between the member states is right and 
necessary. But it should only be a start, 
followed by negotiations on the EU’s stra-
tegic agenda for the next five years with 
the new European Parliament and the new 
Commission. A joint programme drawn up 
in this way – a kind of European coalition 
agreement – would not only do justice to 
the complex network of consensus democ-
racy in the European Union, but would also 
provide the new Commission and the EU 
institutions as a whole with a resilient 
political mandate for the further develop-
ment of the EU. 
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza is Deputy Head of the EU / Europe Division at SWP. 
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